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We show that the patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in Denmark, Finland, 
and Norway, unlike those for the US and the UK, are highly nonlinear. The Nordic 
relationship between log earnings of sons and fathers is flat in the lower segments of the 
fathers’ earnings distribution – sons growing up in the poorest households have the same 
adult earnings prospects as sons in moderately poor households – and is increasingly 
positive in middle and upper segments. This convex pattern contrasts sharply with our 
findings for the United States and the United Kingdom, where the relationship is much 
closer to being linear. As a result, cross-country comparisons of intergenerational 
earnings elasticities may be misleading with respect to transmission mechanisms in the 
central parts of the earnings distribution, and uninformative in the tails of the distribution. 
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It is now a stylised fact that intergenerational earnings mobility is higher in the Nordic 
welfare-state economies than in more market-oriented economies such as the US; see, e.g., 
Björklund and Jäntti (2000) and Solon (2002). To a large extent, this knowledge rests on 
between-country comparisons of either the elasticity of child income with respect to parental 
income (both measured during economically active ages), or of the correlation between parent 
and child (log) permanent incomes. Such comparisons are of course crude, and it is well 
known that elasticity estimates and correlation coefficients are sensitive to data definitions, 
the age at which parents’ and offspring’s incomes are measured, and the treatment of outliers; 
see, e.g., Corak (2006), Grawe (2005), Haider and Solon (2006), and Mazumder (2005).  
Less attention has been paid to the fact that the appropriateness of elasticities and 
correlation coefficients as summary measures of intergenerational earnings mobility also 
depends on the functional form of the relationship between child and parent earnings being 
linear in logs. If the functional form of the intergenerational earnings relationship varies 
across countries, elasticities and correlation coefficients may not provide the appropriate 
foundation for cross-country comparisons. A linear model will involve specification biases 
that are likely to differ across countries and thereby affect the empirical assessment of 
international differences. Moreover, a comparison of countries is less informative if it misses 
how generational persistence differs across the earnings distribution. A plausible explanation 
for this lack of attention is that the relationship appears to be approximately linear in countries 
which have tended to dominate the empirical research on intergenerational earnings mobility, 
such as the UK and the US. As we discuss in Section 2 of this paper, there is an existing 
literature regarding linearity in intergenerational earnings mobility. This literature has focused 
on testing for a concave intergenerational relationship in log earnings – inspired by the 
Becker-Tomes (1986) hypothesis that poor families are credit constrained with respect to 
investments in offspring’s education – with somewhat varying results. The issue of linearity  
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has not been given appropriate attention in the literature regarding mobility comparisons 
across countries.  
Our paper focuses on the empirical analysis of the nature and extent of 
intergenerational earnings mobility in the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, and Norway, 
compared with the UK and the US, by means of comparable data particularly adapted for this 
purpose. Our data confirm the familiar patterns of intergenerational earnings persistence for 
these countries, including the stylised fact of lower elasticities between fathers’ and sons’ 
permanent earnings in the Nordic countries than in the US and the UK. It turns out, however, 
that the functional form of these intergenerational relationships varies widely across countries. 
While linear regressions fit the US – and even the UK – data reasonably well, the same 
regressions applied to the Nordic countries involve severe and serious specification error. The 
relationship between sons’ and fathers’ log earnings in the Nordic countries is not linear, but 
rather convex. Specifically, in the Nordic data the relationship starts out flat, implying that 
whether sons are born into very poor or moderately poor families has little impact on their 
own expected adult earnings.  
  There are a number of possible mechanisms that could explain this phenomenon. One 
is that the educational systems of the Nordic countries have succeeded in providing all 
citizens with sufficiently high basic skills so that, particularly in the bottom of the parents’ 
earnings distribution, the adult earnings of sons are independent of their parents’ economic 
resources. A second explanation holds that the wage setting institutions of the Nordic 
countries effectively have raised the left tail of the earnings distribution and, as a result, have 
eliminated the effect of family background for low wage earners. A third, and related, line of 
reasoning is that the absence of an extended left tail in the Nordic earnings distributions is the 
result of generous welfare systems and their effect on labour supply at low wages.    
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There is, however, a potentially much more mundane explanation for our findings, 
namely that the apparent ‘tail-differences’ across countries stem from differences in data 
measurement rather than genuine differences in economic realities. Transitory shocks to 
parental earnings and life-cycle bias in sons’ earnings are familiar sources of measurement 
error bias in intergenerational studies, and cross-country differences in the importance of 
transitory variability of (low) earnings may well generate differences in the role of bias in 
international data. Another concern would arise if the register-based Nordic data sets contain 
fathers with underreported earnings. We make substantial efforts to discriminate between the 
substantive and the more spurious interpretations of our findings by examining a number of 
alternative indicators of parental wealth, and also by assessing the sensitivity of our results 
with respect to potentially questionable ‘tail’ observations. Our conclusion is that the Nordic 
convexity in intergenerational earnings persistence cannot be explained by measurement 
error.  
The finding of widely different functional form relationships between the earnings of 
fathers and sons across countries does not necessarily render the conventional wisdom of 
higher intergenerational mobility in the Nordic countries invalid, but it certainly invites a 
rethink of the way differences across countries should be both investigated and interpreted.  
 
1. Theoretical motivation  
Discussion of nonlinearities in the relationship between the (log of) earnings of parent and 
child, like much of the economic and statistical analyses of intergenerational mobility, 
originates in the seminal treatment of Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986). In their human capital 
model of the ‘rise and fall of families’ Becker and Tomes (1986) crystallise the argument that 
the relationship is linear in the absence of obstacles to self-financing investments in children, 
but concave if poor families are more borrowing-constrained than rich families. In this  
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section, we illustrate how family investments may affect intergenerational earnings 
persistence in different ways.  
Let et denote inherited human capital endowment (‘ability’) and let It-1 denote income-
related family investment in human capital. We can then write human capital as: 
1 (1)     log ,    0, tt t he I θ θ − =+ ≥ 
In the case  0 θ > , equation (1) can be motivated within the Becker-Tomes framework as 
arising from the existence of borrowing constraints, with θ  a parameter indicating the 
efficacy of investments in the child’s human capital; see Solon (2004). We interpret the 
special case in which  0 θ = , as an educational system which is purely ‘meritocratic’ in the 
sense that human capital acquisition depends only on the child’s underlying ability, 
independent of any income-related family investments.  0 θ =  coincides with the Becker-
Tomes model with bequests and a perfect capital market. With perfect capital markets, even 
the poorest parents could borrow against their child’s future earnings potential and hence 
make optimal investments.  
Let the intergenerational transmission of the inherited endowment be given by: 
1 (2)     , tt t eev λ − =+  
where  t v  is a stochastic error term. Suppose also that offspring (log) earnings are given by: 
(3)    log , tt yp h =  
where  p  is the rate of return on human capital. We focus now on the case with  0 θ > , and 
assume that parents seek to maximise a utility function of the form: 
11 (4)    U log log , tt t Cy −− =+  
through choice of investments,  1 t I − , subject to a budget constraint given by: 
11 1 (5)    y , tt t CI −− − =+  
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where  1 t C −  is parental consumption and we are not allowing for parents to borrow against 
future expected offspring earnings. (If  0 θ = , optimal investment is, of course, zero). 
Substituting (1) and (3) in (4) and maximising subject to (5) yields a value for the optimal 
parental investment of:
1 
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Substituting (6), (1) and (2) in (3), yields the following relationship between offspring and 
parent earnings: 
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The term  1 log t p y θ −  in (7) represents the direct effect of parental investment on child 
earnings, while the term 11 () t p ev λ − +  is correlated with  1 t y −  through its association with  1 t e − . 
The steady-state elasticity between child and parent earnings capturing both the direct effect 
of  1 t y − , through  pθ , and the indirect effect, through λ , is written as (see also Solon, 2004): 











Note that in the special case of equal opportunities in which  0 θ = , it follows that 
β λ =  and hence the result of meritocracy is equivalent to the Becker-Tomes case of perfect 
capital markets. As Grawe and Mulligan (p. 47, 2002) observe, only child ability matters in 
this case. Parental earnings affect child earnings solely through λ ; that is, through the auto-
regression in inherited endowment. Otherwise, for  0 θ > , it follows that        1. β λλ >∀<  
In much of the literature to date, discussion has focused on the distinction between 
perfect (β λ = ) and imperfect (β λ > ) capital markets. We can represent these two cases in 
Figure 1a. 
- Figure 1 (panels 1a and 1b) around here -  
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An implication readily captured in Figure 1a is that of the Becker-Tomes conjecture of 
concavity in the relationship between child and parent earnings. Under the assumption that 
borrowing constraints are more likely to impact on poorer parents, it follows that a slope of β  
>  λ  might apply for lower parental earnings while a slope of λ  will be relevant for higher 
earning parents, creating a concave intergenerational earnings relationship: depicted by the 
bold outlining in Figure 1a. 
While much of the literature has focused on testing for concavity in the child-parent 
earnings relationship, one could pose an alternative hypothesis of convexity, motivated as 
follows. Suppose that all families are borrowing-constrained, possibly because the optimal 
level of investment is higher for children with high ability; see, for example, Han and 
Mulligan (2001) and Grawe and Mulligan (2002). Then the default regression line will have a 
slope given by (8), whereβ λ > . Suppose now that educational policies and institutions are 
designed in such a way that, for lower levels of human capital formation, access to education 
services is characterized by equal opportunity. In this ‘meritocratic’ case, the slope of the 
intergenerational regression line is given by λ , but – unlike in the otherwise equivalent 
Becker-Tomes case – this flatter gradient applies to the lower rather than to the higher earning 
parents. In this scenario, the relationship between child and parent earnings is convex rather 
than concave. This is shown in Figure 1b. 
Figure 1, then, portrays two special cases of nonlinearity. A number of variations on 
these themes suggest themselves. An S-shaped relationship, for example, could be interpreted 
as a combination of meritocratic aspects of human capital formation at the lower levels of 
education and the absence of credit constraints at the highest earning levels. Both the position 
of the discontinuities within the relation and its slope will be determined by institutional 
features both of the education system and of capital and labour markets. Redistributive 
educational policies which provide better-resourced public education in poorer communities  
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(see Hægeland et al. (2004) for evidence on this for Scandinavia) will, in our model, generate 
a lower value of θ  for lower-earning parents, implying convexity of the sort represented in 
Figure 1b. In contrast, for example, in the UK there is a long tradition of private schooling 
and also a growing body of evidence on the effects of state school quality on local house 
prices (see Gibbons and Machin, 2003), indicating substantial parental investments in 
offspring’s human capital. Convexity is less likely in this setting.  
In this theoretical motivation, we have indicated some reasons for which there may be 
nonlinearities in the relationship between child and parent (log) earnings. In the following 
sections, we discuss our strategy for addressing empirically the nature and extent of 
intergenerational mobility across countries. In particular, we are concerned with examining 
whether the earnings relationship across generations is linear or nonlinear and how this might 
vary across countries. First, we provide a brief review of how the literature has addressed the 
issue of linearity.  
2. Existing evidence 
In his seminal article on intergenerational income mobility in the United States, Solon (1992), 
citing evidence from Atkinson et al. (1983) on the asymmetry of mobility in his early English 
study, includes the square of father’s log earnings to allow for nonlinearity. Solon finds some 
evidence that the elasticity is increasing with father’s earnings, but cannot statistically reject 
the hypothesis of linearity.  
Most studies which have considered the issue of nonlinearity have done so in order to 
test the Becker-Tomes conjecture of a concave relationship between offspring’s and parent’s 
earnings. Mazumder (2005) finds evidence for the US consistent with the Becker-Tomes 
framework. Couch and Lillard (2004) provide similar empirical evidence indicating that the 
intergenerational father-son income elasticity is declining in father’s income in the United 
States. They cannot confirm the same hypothesis for Germany. Mulligan (1999), using PSID  
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data, finds that OLS estimates of persistence are the same for both financially constrained and 
the unconstrained.  
Corak and Heisz (1999) pay explicit attention to the issue of nonlinearities in larger 
data samples drawn from Canadian tax records, and conclude that mobility is greater in the 
lower end of the income distribution than in the upper end, contrary to the Becker-Tomes 
conjecture. Behrman and Taubman (1990) use PSID data and include a quadratic in the log of 
parental income, finding some evidence of nonlinearity; the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity seems to rise with parental income.   
Grawe (2004), using Canadian data, reports that middle-earning families experience 
slower regression but, on the basis of quantile regression results, rejects a simple credit-
constraint explanation. Grawe argues that the existence of credit constraints is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for there to be nonlinearities in intergenerational mobility: 
the relationship between child and parent earnings will depend, inter alia, on the nature of the 
earnings function. The implications for international comparisons of intergenerational 
earnings mobility are immediate: the nature of the functional form in the relationship between 
child and parental earnings is likely to vary across countries with the nature of earnings 
relationships as well as with differences in factors relating to financial markets, human capital 
acquisition and with public policy. Solon (2004) makes a similar argument in addressing 
sources of differences in cross-country estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity. 
Han and Mulligan (2001) develop a model of intergenerational mobility based on parental 
investment choices. Their simulations suggest that cross-country differences in mobility are 
more likely to reflect differences in (the heterogeneity of) inherited ability rather than 
differences in optimal family investment choices or policies across countries. This is because 
in their model even the complete elimination of borrowing constraints has little numerical 
effect on the degree of persistence in their simulations.   
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The next sections of the paper describe our empirical analysis which, we believe, 
represents the first study of functional form in the context of a cross-country analysis of 
intergenerational mobility, based on intergenerational samples – standardised as closely as 
possible – for 5 different countries: the UK, the US and the Nordic countries of Denmark, 
Finland and Norway. 
3. Data 
We exploit intergenerational earnings data from five countries; Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. While the data from the UK and the US are based on 
household surveys, the Nordic data are collected from administrative registers. In the present 
paper, we focus on sons because international comparisons of daughters’ incomes entail 
certain complications as patterns of female labour force participation vary across countries.  
The guiding principle behind our adaptation of data from the different countries is to exploit 
the flexibility and richness of register data to ‘mimic’ the data generating processes behind the 
two survey-based datasets. The UK National Child Development Study (NCDS) acts as a 
baseline to which the other data sets are adapted. The NCDS sampled all children born during 
the week of March 3
rd- 9
th, 1958, and is the data source exploited in the work of Dearden et al. 
(1997) and Blanden (2005), inter alia. The most recent sweeps are those from 1991 and 1999, 
providing information on the offspring’s gross earnings at ages 33 and 41. Furthermore, from 
the 1974 sweep we obtain information on fathers’ earnings at a time when the sampled 
children were about 16 years of age.  
Included in the UK analysis sample are sons who are employed (full time or part time) 
with at least one valid earnings observation in 1991 or 1999. Because the age of the father 
was recorded only in the initial sweep (in 1958), the sample is limited to those living with 
their biological father in 1974. In addition to father’s earnings, we consider family income 
which is computed as the sum of father’s and mother’s net pay, plus income from other  
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sources.
2 The income measures are converted to annual income and inflated from the 
interview month (which ranges from January 1973 to February 1975) to 2000 currency. 
Excluded from the sample are those whose father or mother report being employed at the time 
of the 1974 sweep but failed to provide pay information. Also excluded are families where 
neither the father nor the mother provides any pay information at all. Finally, we exclude 28 
observations from the father’s earnings sample, and 22 observations from the family income 
sample, where reported income appears to be an extreme outlier.
3  
Our US data are based on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). In 
order to obtain a sample of reasonable size, while maintaining comparability with the UK 
data, we include the birth cohorts between 1957 and 1964 in the US sample. Parental income 
refers to family income from all sources in 1978 and 1979, when the children were between 
13 and 21 years old. Sample inclusion requires that we can link children and fathers, either 
because the respondent or a (younger) biological sibling lived in the same residence as the 
father at the time when we observe parental income. The children’s earnings refer to annual 
wage or salary income in 1995 and 2001.
4 
For Norway, we have drawn the complete 1958 birth cohort from population registers, 
matched with biological fathers’ earnings records from 1971 and 1976. Earnings records for 
both father and son generations are drawn from the pension register, and include incomes 
from all labour-related sources such as wage and salary income, self-employment earnings (net 
of interest payments), unemployment benefits, and long-term sickness benefits. Sons’ earnings 
are measured in 1992 and 1999. For Denmark, we also use the 1958 birth cohort, with 
biological fathers’ earnings measured in 1980 and 1981 and sons’ earnings measured in 1998 
and 2000.
5 The earnings information emanates from tax registers covering total earnings from 
all employers paid to each worker during the year. These data are considered to be of high 
quality as they are used by tax authorities to assess each employee’s earnings. As the wage  
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records also constitute deductible labour costs for employers, firms have a strong incentive to 
provide accurate and timely information to tax authorities. During the period studied, there 
was no change in the construction of the earnings variable.  
For Finland, we use the 1956-1960 birth cohorts included in the quinquennial census 
panel covering the 1970-2000 period. As with the US sample, we use multiple birth cohorts 
out of sample size concerns. Fathers’ earnings are observed in 1970 and 1975 and sons’ 
earnings are observed in 1998 and 2001. The main source for the earnings data is tax records, 
which across the relevant years had quite similar definitions of earnings, including all wages 
and salaries and both farm and non-farm self-employment income as defined for purposes of 
taxation. We use 1998 and 2001 for sons' earnings as the very high unemployment rates in the 
early to mid-1990s in Finland cause unnecessarily noisy earnings in earlier years.  
All earnings measures used in this paper are adjusted for general wage growth and are 
measured in terms of international US dollars in year 2000 prices. We convert national 
currencies using the PPP exchange rates in World Development Indicators 2003 and use 
national CPI price indices to convert nominal amounts into the year 2000 prices.
6 Note that in 
our baseline analyses, all income measures are based on two observation years, with the 
exception of parents in the UK for whom only a single year of earnings data are available. 
But, as becomes clear in the next sections, we also provide a number of modifications of the 
data for pair-wise comparisons, with alternative definitions of both parental and offspring 
income; e.g., by using more than two observation years to identify ‘permanent income,’ and 
alternating between using father’s earnings only and family income as our measure of the 
households’ economic resources.   
4. The functional form between fathers’ and sons’ permanent earnings  
The standard way of addressing the issue of the intergenerational transfer of earnings is to set 
up a linear log earnings regression equation, with some measure of the permanent earnings of  
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the sons on the left-hand side, and the permanent income of the father (or the family) along 
with age controls on the right-hand side. In this section, we first show the results of such 
linear regressions for each of the five countries, based on the baseline datasets described in 
the previous section. To evaluate the model specifications, we first plot the computed 
regression lines together with a direct representation of the data points. In order to make the 
data points interpretable, we have divided each data set into percentiles of the distribution of 
parental earnings; i.e., each data point gives the mean log earnings of sons and parents for 
each percentile of the parental earnings distribution. Figures 2 and 3 provide the results for the 
US and the UK, respectively. The slopes of the regression lines (i.e., estimates of the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity based on the 100 grouped data points) are 0.55 in the US 
plot and 0.44 in the UK plot. Both regression lines seem to fit well with the 100 data points, 
lending support to the linear representation of these functional relationships. 
- Figures 2 and 3 around here - 
  Figures 4-6 provide similar plots for the Danish, Finnish, and Norwegian data. The 
slopes of the regression lines clearly indicate higher earnings mobility in these countries than 
in the UK and the US. The slopes are 0.12 for Denmark, 0.16 for Norway, and 0.19 for 
Finland. These estimates are in line with those of prior studies, such as Bratberg et al. (2005) 
for Norway and Österbacka (2001) for Finland. The main message coming out of these 
graphs, however, is that of functional form misspecification. The source of nonlinearity is that 
the sons’ earnings profiles are flat at the bottom of the fathers’ earnings distribution. Although 
there are certain differences across countries (and different degrees of noise in the scatter 
plots reflecting differences in sample size), it seems to be the case for all three countries that 
there is little relationship between the earnings of fathers and sons for the lowest 15-20 
percentiles of the fathers’ earnings distribution. In other words, a child from the 1
st percentile 
of the fathers’ earnings distributions faces roughly the same adult earnings prospects as a  
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child from the 20
th percentile. At higher percentiles, the appropriate regression lines are 
clearly much steeper than those indicated by the estimated elasticities based on the linear 
model. Hence, the low intergenerational elasticities typically reported for the Nordic countries 
are not representative for the majority of the population. In particular, they understate the 
degree of earnings persistence in central and upper parts of the parental earnings distribution. 
- Figures 4-6 around here - 
  Given that the linear regressions do not always appear to fit the data well, we now turn 
to more flexible regression specifications. Our main strategy is to make the functional forms 
more flexible by adding higher-order polynomial terms to the five regression equations, to the 
extent that these are supported by the data. We then select the preferred specification for each 
country based on minimum root mean squared error (or, equivalently, maximum adjusted R
2). 
By this model selection criterion, nonlinear models are preferred for all countries: second-
order polynomials for Finland, the UK, and the US, a third-order polynomial for Norway, and 
fourth-order for Denmark. For each estimated equation, we report three son-father earnings 
elasticities, evaluated at the 10
th, 50
th, and 90
th percentiles of fathers’ earnings. Key results are 
reported in Table 1.  
- Table 1 around here - 
  The results in Table 1 show that, in all of the countries considered, the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is higher in the middle than at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution. For the Nordic countries, the difference is highly significant both in a statistical 
and a substantive sense. (For the UK and the US, there are some, but not robust, indications of 
a convex functional form.). A striking illustration of the specification bias in the Nordic data 
is that elasticity estimates from the linear model fall 27 (Finland), 45 (Norway), and 50 
percent (Denmark) below those from the linear model and evaluated at the median of father’s 
earnings. In other words, the extremely high Nordic mobility suggested by the linear model  
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understates the impact of parental earnings on the adult economic outcomes of children in 
these countries. For the UK and the US, estimates from the linear specification are in line with 
those from the nonlinear model. As such, comparisons of intergenerational persistence based 
on the linear model overstate differences across countries. For example, the comparison of 
persistence in the US and the Nordic countries overstates the difference by 12 (Finland),
7 26 
(Denmark), and 31 percent (Norway) when based on the linear as opposed to the nonlinear 
model evaluated at median earnings. A final pattern to emerge from the table is that 
differences between the Nordic countries on the one hand and the UK and the US on the other 
are much smaller in the middle and the top of the income distribution than at the bottom. 
Notwithstanding these results, intergenerational earnings mobility remains significantly 
higher in the Nordic countries than in the US (according to the elasticity measures) 
throughout the income distribution.  
5. Is the evidence for the Nordic countries the result of measurement error?  
Estimates of intergenerational earnings mobility in the Nordic countries are typically based on 
administrative register data. And, because of the requirement that both fathers and sons need 
be observed at economically active ages, it will often be the case that fathers’ earnings are 
measured in the 1970s or early 1980s. During that time period, the Nordic countries had 
strongly progressive tax schedules that also embodied a number of options for legal (as well 
as illegal) ‘income manipulation’ for the purpose of tax avoidance. Hence, an important 
concern is that some of the fathers who are classified as ‘poor’ in intergenerational income 
studies are in fact very rich, and that this might be the true reason why their children perform 
so well. An alternative explanation is that some parents had very volatile annual earnings, so 
that the use of only two years worth of data for identification of parental earnings renders the 
‘poor parents group’ a mixture of actual poor parents and parents who are not really poor, but 
happened to have low earnings in these particular years only. Solon (1992) - see also  
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Mazumder (2005) - demonstrates that, because of persistent transitory fluctuations of 
earnings, using a single year of parental earnings leads to serious downward bias in US 
elasticity estimates. In both cases of under-reported earnings and of transitory fluctuations, the 
stylised fact of high intergenerational mobility in the Nordic countries may be an illusion, 
created by data measurement error. Further, samples based on administrative registers on the 
one hand and survey data on the other invariably entail differences in sample design and 
measurement of key variables that may influence results. In this section, we address whether 
such issues drive our conclusions. 
Family income. One source of cross-country data differences is that of the definition 
of earnings. While the son’s earnings in all five countries refer to the wage and salary income 
from work during the calendar year, data on father’s earnings are unfortunately not available 
in the US, for which we use log family income from all sources. Further, use of father’s 
earnings presents a potential data problem if they do not fully capture the economic resources 
of the family, particularly for low-income fathers. It is commonly held that mobility measures 
based on family income (‘all sources’) show more intergenerational persistence than estimates 
from earnings (Chadwick and Solon, 2002). Studies from the US, e.g., Solon (1992) and 
Peters (1992), typically report estimates using the same income measure for both generations 
and it is plausible that non-labour income, for example from financial capital or property, is 
transmitted mechanically from one generation to the next contributing to high persistence of 
family income. The evidence on the impact of family income relative to father’s earnings on 
individual offspring earnings is less clear cut, however. For example, Mazumder (2005) 
reports higher persistence using family income, but this result turns out to be driven mainly by 
sample selectivity, as a comparison based on the same individuals discloses only a minor 
difference between the two approaches.   
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For these reasons, we re-estimate the linear and nonlinear models for four of the 
countries, replacing fathers’ earnings with family income (alternatively, the sum of earnings 
of both parents when income from other sources is not available). Results appear in Table 2. 
As the table shows, replacing father’s earnings with family income increases the 
intergenerational elasticity estimates by a small amount in two of the countries (Denmark and 
Finland), but reduces the estimate in the other two (Norway and the UK). Importantly, the 
nonlinearity results from Table 1 prevail: even when we use family earnings as the measure of 
parental resources, intergenerational persistence follows a highly convex pattern in the Nordic 
countries, while in the UK there are no indications of nonlinearity. For Finland, we have data 
on both parental earnings and income from other sources, including self-employment and 
transfers such as disability and maternity-leave allowances. Using the broader income 
measure reduces the degree of convexity somewhat, but the empirical evidence still points to 
a highly nonlinear functional form. The results in Table 2 therefore show that the patterns of 
nonlinearity in the Nordic countries and linearity in the UK and the US are unlikely to result 
from differences in definition of parental income. 
- Table 2 around here - 
Transitory shocks or lifecycle bias.  A second concern is that measurement of 
permanent earnings based on only two observations imparts measurement error, and this may 
be particularly severe in the left tail of the earnings distribution. We take advantage of the 
long panels of earnings records available for both generations in the Norwegian data, and re-
estimate the equations using ten years of earnings for fathers and eleven years for sons (see 
results in Table 3, column 1). If anything, this experiment increases the degree of nonlinearity 
in the earnings relation. While the elasticity estimate in the lower tail is similar to that based 
on only two observations, the estimate in the upper tail is ten percent higher than that in Table 
1.  Curiously, the elasticity estimate from the linear model declines compared to that based on  
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only two years of fathers’ earnings. At first glance, this finding runs counter to the standard 
argument that more years provide a better measure of permanent earnings. The reason for the 
Norwegian pattern turns out to be that, when we average fathers’ earnings over several years, 
the sample will include fathers who are excluded in single years because of zero earnings. 
This group of fathers tends to have low earnings in years with positive earnings. Thus, their 
inclusion in the sample exacerbates the specification error of the linear model. When we 
restrict the sample to fathers with non-zero earnings in all years, we find, along the lines of 
Mazumder (2005), indication of attenuation bias in single-year based estimates.  
- Table 3 around here - 
Sample selection bias; fathers. A third concern is that cross-country differences with 
respect to patterns of nonlinearity might result from differences in sample design. Recall that, 
for two of the Nordic countries (Denmark and Norway), fathers and sons are matched through 
birth records. Thus, in cases where sons are separated from their biological father, our use of 
father’s earnings may not accurately reflect the son’s economic circumstance during 
childhood and adolescence. In contrast, the UK and US samples, for whom we do not find 
nonlinearity, are based on household surveys and our linkage of fathers and sons is 
conditional of them living in the same household. This raises the question whether the Nordic 
pattern is driven by our matching low-income fathers to sons when they actually live apart. To 
investigate this issue, we restrict the Danish and Norwegian samples to families where we 
observe the mother and father living together, which raises the likelihood that the son also 
lives with the father. Results based on the restricted samples are listed in Table 3, for Norway 
in columns 2 and 3, and for Denmark in columns 4 and 5. These sensitivity checks fail to 
uncover results that differ in any meaningful sense from those of the prior tables, and in each 
case considered there is evidence of significant convexity. Finally, the baseline results from 
Finland, where matching of father and son is conditional on the two living in the same  
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household in the 1970 or 1975 censuses, provide further evidence that the nonlinear relation 
uncovered for the Nordic countries is not the consequence of sample design.
8    
Sample selection bias; sons. Because only strictly positive earnings are used in the 
regression analysis of log earnings, there is another problematic selection issue involved in 
the calculation of intergenerational earnings elasticities. If the probability that sons report zero 
earnings is inversely related to parental income, this might bias the estimated income 
elasticities at low parental income levels downwards and can, perhaps, explain the observed 
nonlinear patterns. The relatively generous Nordic welfare systems might be expected to 
exacerbate any such selection effect, as labour market withdrawal is more attractive than in 
the US. As shown in Table 4, which reports results from probit regressions of sample 
exclusion on log parental earnings, it is indeed the case that sample exclusion in the Nordic 
samples declines with parental resources. However, it turns out that the negative relationship 
between parental income and the likelihood that the son has zero earnings is even stronger in 
the UK and in the US. Hence, the selection problem caused by zero earnings among sons is an 
unlikely candidate to explain the observed differences of the Nordic countries from the UK 
and the US.  
- Table 4 around here - 
Under-reported earnings. If some of the fathers in the lowest earnings percentiles in 
the data were in fact highly paid, we would expect them to have accumulated greater 
economic wealth later in life than is typically associated with very low earnings. In the Nordic 
data samples, we have access to gross taxable wealth about 20 years after we observe 
earnings, and in the upper panel of Figure 7 we plot the relationship between economic wealth 
in 1994 and the percentile-position in the earnings distribution of the baseline years. As the 
measure of gross wealth includes property value (although recorded below market value), 
wealth is more difficult to conceal than income. The plot does not suggest that fathers in the  
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bottom of the earnings distribution may have had large unreported economic resources. 
Particularly in the Norwegian sample, the relationship between earnings and subsequent 
wealth 20 years hence is steep in the lower tail of the earnings distribution.  
- Figure 7 around here - 
Taxable wealth in 1994 is, of course, only recorded for fathers who were still alive in 
1994. And, as illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 7, only 30 (Finland) and 40 percent 
(Denmark and Norway) of fathers in the lowest earnings percentile were still alive by the mid 
to late 1990s. In comparison, around 80 percent of the fathers in the upper earnings 
percentiles were still alive. Given the existing scientific evidence on social gradients in health 
status and mortality rates, we interpret the plot as additional evidence that the observed 
earnings distribution in the 1970s indeed represents the true economic resources of Nordic 
fathers quite well. 
Common sample restrictions. Even though the above analysis suggests that the low-
income fathers in the Nordic samples were indeed poor, it remains a concern that their 
recorded earnings may understate their true economic resources. And, as was apparent from 
Figures 2-6, the very poorest percentile groups of fathers in the Nordic samples are recorded 
with much lower earnings than their counterparts in the UK and the US, and their inclusion in 
the regression sample has a strong influence on the specification bias of the linear model. In 
the final sensitivity check, we examine the consequences of imposing a common sample 
restriction on the data, and drop from the regression samples fathers (or families) with 
earnings below $3,000. The results are reported in Table 5. The elasticities, both in the linear 
and nonlinear specifications, are higher than without the low-income sample restriction. For 
example, the Danish elasticity is now 0.169 as opposed to 0.121 in the linear case and 0.254 
compared to 0.241 in the linear case evaluated at the median of father's earnings. However,  
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the nonlinear functional form is still supported by the data for the Nordic countries and the 
elasticities are lower than in the US (and the UK) throughout the earnings distribution. 
 
6. Educational attainment and parental earnings  
From the investigations in the previous section, we conclude that the nonlinear pattern 
uncovered in the Nordic countries, with relatively favourable adult earnings among sons from 
the poorest households, reflects genuine economic realities and can not be explained by data 
deficiencies such as measurement error. What, then, are the mechanisms? Because skills and 
educational attainment are closely linked to family background, including parental earnings, 
nonlinear returns to schooling could be an explanation. However, prior empirical studies do 
not suggest low marginal returns for the first years of post-compulsory education, see, e.g., 
Hægeland et al. (1999).  
A nonlinear association between human capital and parental earnings provides an 
alternative, and more promising, hypothesis. As discussed in our theoretical motivation, 
Nordic educational policies are highly redistributive in that they provide better-resourced 
public schools in poor communities as well as targeted individual teaching to children with 
limited learning capacities. The explicit motive behind redistributive educational policies is to 
offset what would otherwise be an educational disadvantage for children of poorer parents. To 
the extent that these policies are targeted at establishing common minimum standards of 
educational attainment, we might expect to observe an ‘education floor’ in the Nordic 
countries. In Figure 8, we plot the associations between parental earnings and years of 
schooling in Denmark, Finland, Norway and the US. The patterns are very similar to what we 
have seen for earnings in all of the four countries. While variation in economic resources of 
the family seems to have minimal influence on attainment in the first earnings quantile in the 
Nordic countries, it does affect schooling more in the US. The nonlinear relationship between  
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economic resources of the family and the offspring’s human capital presents an avenue to 
explore further in order to understand the drivers behind the nonlinear patterns of earnings 
persistence in the Nordic countries. We leave this to further work. 
- Figure 8 around here - 
7. Concluding remarks  
We have shown that the patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in the Nordic 
countries are highly nonlinear, and that the regression lines linking sons’ and fathers’ log 
earnings are flat in the bottom segments of the fathers’ earnings distribution. The adult 
earnings prospects of sons born into the very lowest percentiles of the fathers’ earnings 
distribution are remarkably similar to those of the sons born into the 15
th-20
th percentiles in 
each of the Nordic countries included in our analysis (Denmark, Finland, and Norway). This 
pattern contrasts with the results for the US and the UK, where the relationships between the 
sons’ and fathers’ earnings are much closer to being linear throughout the income distribution.  
We have shown that intergenerational earnings mobility is higher in the Nordic 
countries than in the US, for all parts of the parental earnings distribution, while mobility in 
the UK lies between the two. However, the nonlinearity we have identified means that the 
differences between the Nordic countries and both the US and the UK are much larger at the 
bottom of the parental earnings distribution than at the top. As a result, cross-country 
comparisons of intergenerational earnings elasticities from linear models are misleading. The 
linear model also represents a serious misspecification in the Nordic countries and 
comparisons based on such estimates tend to overstate the high earnings mobility in these 
countries. The finding also implies that the prospects for moving out of poverty in the US and 
the UK are poorer than in the Nordic countries. 
We have made careful attempts to check the robustness of our results against possible 
data problems and conclude that the nonlinear pattern uncovered in the Nordic countries is  
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genuine and not a result of, for example, measurement error. We have also provided 
preliminary evidence that our findings might be related to institutional differences in 
educational systems. Nordic policy makers have traditionally made large efforts to ensure 
equal educational standards for all citizens, regardless of geographical location (Raaum et al., 
2003; 2006) and family economic resources. One potential explanation for our findings is thus 
that, consistent with our theoretical discussion, Nordic educational policies have been 
successful in creating a kind of qualifications floor, to which most citizens can aspire, 
regardless of parental resources.     
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Endnotes 
1 We assume that returns to human capital investments, pθ , are sufficiently large to provide an inner solution. 
2 NCDS reports income by source “father’s earnings,” “mother’s earnings” and “other income,” each component 
within weekly or monthly intervals. We assign a value to each interval applying the algorithm of Blanden 
(2005), who uses the within-band mean value for each income component obtained from comparable families in 
the 1974 Family Expenditure Survey. Sensitivity checks, using data from the other countries of this study, in 
which we mimic the income brackets of the UK data, yield results that are very similar to those reported below 
based on non-bracketed data. 
3 Sample exclusion is based on a regression of log(father’s earnings) or log(family income) on home ownership, 
father’s and mother’s occupations, educational attainments, and ages, plus interaction terms. We drop 
observations when the absolute value of the residual exceeds three times the root mean squared error of the 
regression. In the father sample, 25 observations are dropped because of extremely low values, and three because 
of extremely high values. In the family income sample, the algorithm dropped 19 observation with extremely 
low, and 3 with extremely high, values. Further details are available from the authors upon request.  
4 Because the NLSY79 contains supplementary samples of Hispanic, black, and poor households, we apply the 
sampling weights from the initial survey. Results are very similar, albeit less precise, if we restrict the analysis to 
the representative subsample of the survey. 
5 As in the UK data, we drop some apparent extreme outliers from the Danish sample. Sample inclusion is based 
on a regression of log(father’s earnings) on father’s age and educational attainment, log(wealth in 1994), and a 
dummy variable for missing wealth data. The procedure drops 559 observations with residuals that in absolute 
value exceeds three times the regression’s root mean squared error, all with extremely low earnings. Further 
details are available upon request. 
6 We use one PPP for each of the parents’ (DK 1980, FI and NO 1975, UK 1974, US 1978) and sons’ earnings 
(NO and UK 1999, elsewhere 2000). 
7 I.e., (0.542-0.189)/(0.575-0.259); see Table 1. 
8 On the other hand, the data samples do not allow us to rule out that convexity may be present even in the US 
and the UK, and that our failure to find nonlinearity is due to stronger sample selection effects in these countries 
than in the Nordic countries or to systematic non-reporting of earnings among poor households in survey data.   
 
References 
Atkinson, A. B., Maynard, A.K. and Trinder, C. G. (1983). Parents and Children: Incomes in 
Two Generations, London: Neinemann. 
Becker, G.S. and Tomes, N. (1979.). ‘An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income 
and Intergenerational Mobility’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 87(6), pp. 1153-
89.    
Becker, G.S. and Tomes, N. (1986). ‘Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families,’ 
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 4(2), pp. S1-S39.    
Behrman, J. R. and Taubman, P. (1990). ‘The intergenerational correlation between children’s 
adult earnings and their parents’ income: results from the Michigan Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics’, Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 36(2), pp. 115-127. 
Björklund, A. and Jäntti, M. (2000). ‘Intergenerational mobility of socio-economic   
status in comparative perspective’, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Vol 26.(1), 
3-22.  
Blanden, J. (2005). Intergenerational Mobility, Ph.D. Thesis, University College London. 
Bratberg, E., Nielsen, Ø.A., and Vaage, K. (2005). ‘Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in 
Norway: Levels and Trends,’ Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 107(3), pp. 
419-35. 
Chadwick, L. and Solon, G.  (2002). ‘Intergeneraational Income Mobility among Daughters’, 
The American Economic Review, Vol.92, No.1 pp. 335-344.   
  24
Corak, M. (2006). ‘Do poor children become poor adults? Lessons from a cross country 
comparison of generational earnings mobility,’ IZA Discussion Paper No.1993, 
March. 
Corak, M., and Heisz, S. (1999). ‘The intergenerational earnings and income mobility of 
Canadian men: evidence from longitudinal income tax data,’ Journal of Human 
Resources, vol. 34(3), pp. 504-33.   
Couch, K.A., and Lillard, D.R. (2004). ‘Linear Patterns of Intergenerational Mobility in 
Germany and the United States,’ Chapter 8 in M. Corak, ed. Generational Income 
Mobility in North America and Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Dearden, L., Machin, S., and Reed, H. (1997). ‘Intergenerational mobility in Britain,’ 
Economic Journal, vol. 107(1), pp. 47-66. 
Gibbons, S. and Machin, S. (2003). ‘Valuing English primary schools,’ Journal of Urban 
Economics, vol. 53(2), pp. 197-219. 
Grawe, N.D. (2004). ‘Reconsidering the use of nonlinearities in intergenerational earnings 
lifecycle as a test for credit constraints,’ Journal of Human Resources, vol. 39(3), pp. 
813-27. 
Grawe, N.D. (2005). ‘Lifecycle bias in estimates of intergenerational earnings persistence,’ 
Labour Economics, in press. 
Grawe, N.D., and Mulligan, C.B. (2002). ‘Economic interpretations of intergenerational 
correlations,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16(3), pp. 45-58. 
Haider, S., and Solon, G. (2006). ‘Life-cycle variation in the association between current and 
lifetime earnings,’ American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Han, S. and Mulligan, C. B. (2001). ‘Human capital, heterogeneity and estimated degrees of 
intergenerational mobility,’ Economic Journal, vol. 111 (April), pp207-243. 
Hægeland, T., Klette, T.J., and Salvanes, K.G. (1999). ‘Declining returns to education in 
Norway? Comparing estimates across cohorts, sectors and over time,’ Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, vol. 101(4), pp. 555-76. 
Hægeland, T. Raaum, O., and Salvanes, K.G. (2004). ‘Pupil achievement, school resources 
and family background’, Discussion paper 397, Statistics Norway. 
Mazumder, B. (2005). ‘Fortunate sons: new estimates of intergenerational mobility in the 
United States using social security earnings data,’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 87(2), pp. 235-55. 
Mulligan, C. B. (1999). ‘Galton versus the human capital approach,’ Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 107(6) Part 2, pp. S184-S224. 
Peters, H. E. (1992). ‘Patterns of intergenerational mobility in income and earnings,’ Review 
of Economics and Statistics, vol 74(3), pp. 456-466.  
Raaum, O., Salvanes, K.G. and Sørensen, E.Ø. (2003). ‘The impact of a primary school social 
stratification: A Norwegian study of neighbour and school mate correlations,’ Swedish 
Economic Policy Review, vol. 10(2), pp. 143-69. 
Raaum, O., Salvanes, K.G. and Sørensen, E.Ø. (2006). ‘The neighbourhood is not what it 
used to be,’ Economic Journal, vol. 116 (January), pp. 278-300. 
Solon, G. (1992). ‘Intergenerational income mobility in the United States,’ American 
Economic Review, Vol. 82(3), pp. 393-408. 
Solon, G. (2002). ‘Cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings mobility,’ Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, vol. 16(3), pp. 59-66. 
Solon, G. (2004). ‘A Model of intergenerational mobility variation over time and place’, in 
M. Corak, ed. Generational Income Mobility in North America and Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Österbacka, E. (2001). ‘Family background and economic status in Finland,’ Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, vol. 103(3), pp. 467-484.  
  25
 
Panel  (a)         Panel  (b) 
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USA: son 1995 and 2001, parents 1978 and 1979
 
Fig. 2. Log earnings of sons and parental income in the United States. Regression line [slope = 
0.547(0.035)] and mean log earnings of sons and parents for each percentile of the parental income 
distribution.  
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UK: son 1991 and 1999, father 1974
 
Fig. 3. Log earnings of sons and fathers in the United Kingdom. Regression line [slope=0.444(0.036)] 










































Denmark: son 1998 and 2000, father 1980 and 1981
 
Fig. 4. Log earnings of sons and fathers in Denmark. Regression line [slope=0.119(0.011)] and mean 






































Finland: son 1998 and 2001, father 1970 and 1975
 
Fig. 5. Log earnings of sons and fathers in Finland. Regression line [slope=0.190(0.015)] and mean 













































Norway: son 1992 and 1999, father 1971 and 1976
 
Fig. 6. Log earnings of sons and fathers in Norway. Regression line [slope=0.159(0.012)] and mean 
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Fig. 8. Sons’ educational attainment and parental earnings. Regression line [slopes are 0.505(0.079) in 
Denmark, 0.574(0.057) in Finland, 0.778(0.079) in Norway, and 1.346(.105) in the US] and mean 
years of schooling vs. mean log parental earnings for each percentile of earnings distribution (father’s 
earnings in Nordic countries and parental income in the US).  
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Table 1. Intergenerational earnings persistence – elasticity estimates 
       
 Denmark  Finland  Norway  UK  US 
       
Linear model       
Elasticity  0.121 0.189 0.156 0.450 0.542 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.032) (0.032) 
       
RESET  test,  p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.193 
       
Nonlinear model       
At 10
th  percentile  0.063 0.138 0.168 0.346 0.489 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.073) (0.039) 
       
At 50
th  percentile  0.241 0.259 0.281 0.424 0.575 
  (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.036) (0.035) 
       
At 90
th  percentile  0.312 0.339 0.368 0.531 0.646 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.060) (0.055) 
       
p-value  nonlinear  vs.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.019 
linear  model       
       
Observations  18 706  9 706  26 628  2 384  1 999 
       
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nonlinear results are based on second 
(Finland, UK, and US), third (Norway), and fourth (Denmark) order polynomial specification of 
ln(father’s earnings) (family income in the US). Selection of polynomial order is based on root 




Table 2. Elasticity of son’s earnings with respect to family income 
        
 Denmark  Finland  Norway  UK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Linear model       
Elasticity  0.155 0.216 0.231 0.138 0.359 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.033) 
       
RESET  test,  p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.556 
       
Nonlinear model       
At 10
th  percentile  0.153 0.149 0.173 0.154 0.322 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.046) 
       
At 50
th  percentile  0.271 0.288 0.266 0.269 0.367 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.033) 
       
At 90
th  percentile  0.336 0.366 0.324 0.358 0.412 
  (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.055) 
       
p-value  nonlinear  vs.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.247 
linear  model       
       





















       
Observations  18 706  9 856  9 937  27 364  2 337 
       
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nonlinear results are based on second 
(Finland and UK), third (Norway), and fourth (Denmark) order polynomial specification of 





Table 3. Sensitivity analyses  
           
 Norway  Denmark 
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) 
Linear model        
Elasticity  0.139 0.160 0.140    0.124  0.157 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
           
RESET test, p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
           
Nonlinear model        
At 10
th  percentile  0.178 0.166 0.154    0.062  0.153 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.009)    (0.015)  (0.017) 
           
At 50
th  percentile  0.314 0.285 0.276    0.254  0.279 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)    (0.018)  (0.018) 
           
At 90
th  percentile  0.405 0.379 0.369    0.340  0.369 
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.023)  (0.026) 
           
p-value nonlinear vs.  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
linear  model           
           
Observations  27 108  24 536  25 228    16 373  16 373 































          
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Nonlinear results are based on third 
(Norway) and fourth (Denmark) order polynomial specification of ln(parents’ earnings). 
Regressions control for father’s age and its square.  
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Table 4. Probability that son is excluded from earnings sample because of 
zero earnings; probit regressions 
       
  Denmark Finland  Norway  UK  US 
       
       
ln(father’s earnings)  -.0145 -.0174 -.0067 -.0459 -.0301 
  (.0023) (.0029) (.0011) (.0120) (.0077) 
       
Observations  20 648  10 431  27 295  2 487  2 134 
       
Mean exclusion rate   .0928  .0695  .0244  .0515  .0633 
       
Note: Gross samples consist of all sons with at least one valid earnings observation. “Sample 
exclusion” means that the son is recorded with zero earnings (Denmark, Finland, and Norway), 
reports being unemployed or otherwise economically inactive (UK), or reports zero earnings 
(US). In the UK sample, self-employed persons are omitted from the gross sample (because 
self-employment income is not reported in the survey). Among those excluded, 100 (Denmark), 
97 (Finland), 84 (Norway), 31 (UK), and 61 (US) percent have zero earnings both observation 
years. Coefficients reflect change in probability (dp/dx). Standard errors are reported in 




Table 5. Elasticity estimates using common sample restriction 
         
 Denmark  Finland  Norway  US 
Earnings of:  Father  Family  Father Family Father Family Family 
         
Linear model         
Elasticity 0.169  0.202  0.247 0.260 0.240 0.224 0.555 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.035) 
         
RESET  test,  p-value 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.126 
         
Nonlinear model         
At 10
th percentile  0.083  0.159  0.184 0.186 0.187 0.171 0.486 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.050) 
         
At 50
th percentile  0.254  0.278  0.262 0.290 0.294 0.274 0.576 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.035) 
         
At 90
th percentile  0.332  0.341  0.321 0.352 0.360 0.352 0.651 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.023) (0.062) 
         
p-value  nonlinear  vs.  0.000 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 
linear  model         
         
Observations  18 121  18 411  9 417  9 673  26 245  26 978  1 995 
         
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All samples are limited to those with parental 
earnings of at least $3,000. Nonlinear results are based on second (Finland and US), third 
(Norway), and fourth (Denmark) order polynomial specification of ln(parental earnings). 
Regressions control for father’s age and its square. 